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Auction Mechanisms Toward Efficient Resource Sharing for Cloudlets in Mobile Cloud Computing

A-Long Jin ; Wei Song ; Ping Wang ; Niyato, Dusit ; Peijian Ju

IEEE transactions on services computing, 2016-11, Vol.9 (6), p.895-909 [Periódico revisado por pares]

Piscataway: IEEE

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  • Título:
    Auction Mechanisms Toward Efficient Resource Sharing for Cloudlets in Mobile Cloud Computing
  • Autor: A-Long Jin ; Wei Song ; Ping Wang ; Niyato, Dusit ; Peijian Ju
  • Assuntos: Auctioning ; Cloud computing ; cloudlet ; Cost accounting ; double auction ; Efficiency ; incentive design ; Incentives ; Mechanical factors ; Mobile cloud computing ; Mobile communication ; Mobile computing ; Mobile handsets ; Resource allocation ; Resource management ; truthfulness
  • É parte de: IEEE transactions on services computing, 2016-11, Vol.9 (6), p.895-909
  • Descrição: Mobile cloud computing offers an appealing paradigm to relieve the pressure of soaring data demands and augment energy efficiency for future green networks. Cloudlets can provide available resources to nearby mobile devices with lower access overhead and energy consumption. To stimulate service provisioning by cloudlets and improve resource utilization, a feasible and efficient incentive mechanism is required to charge mobile users and reward cloudlets. Although auction has been considered as a promising form for incentive, it is challenging to design an auction mechanism that holds certain desirable properties for the cloudlet scenario. Truthfulness and system efficiency are two crucial properties in addition to computational efficiency, individual rationality and budget balance. In this paper, we first propose a feasible and truthful incentive mechanism (TIM), to coordinate the resource auction between mobile devices as service users (buyers) and cloudlets as service providers (sellers). Further, TIM is extended to a more efficient design of auction (EDA). TIM guarantees strong truthfulness for both buyers and sellers, while EDA achieves a fairly high system efficiency but only satisfies strong truthfulness for sellers. We also show the difficulties for the buyers to manipulate the resource auction in EDA and the high expected utility with truthful bidding.
  • Editor: Piscataway: IEEE
  • Idioma: Inglês
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  • Realização: ABCD-USP USP   Logos de Redes Sociais: Freepik

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