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Mathematics and democracy designing better voting and fair-division procedures

Steven J Brams

Princeton, N.J Princeton University Press c2008

Localização: FEA - Fac. Econ. Adm. Contab. e Atuária  ACERVO DELFIM NETTO  (B19.23.11 ) e outros locais(Acessar)

  • Título:
    Mathematics and democracy designing better voting and fair-division procedures
  • Autor: Steven J Brams
  • Assuntos: Voting -- Mathematical models; Elections -- Mathematical models; Finance, Public -- Mathematical models; ELEIÇÕES (PROCESSO POLÍTICO) (MODELOS MATEMÁTICOS); VOTO (MODELOS MATEMÁTICOS)
  • Notas: Includes bibliographical references (p. [343]-362) and index
  • Descrição: Electing a single winner : approval voting in practice -- Electing a single winner : approval voting in theory -- Electing a single winner : combining approval and preference -- Electing multiple winners : constrained approval voting -- Electing multiple winners : the minimax procedure -- Electing multiple winners : minimizing misrepresentation -- Selecting winners in multiple elections -- Selecting a governing coalition in a parliament -- Allocating cabinet ministries in a parliament -- Allocating indivisible goods : help the worst-off or avoid envy? -- Allocating a single homogeneous divisible good : divide-the-dollar -- Allocating multiple homogeneous divisible goods : adjusted winner -- Allocating a single heterogeneous good : cutting a cake -- Allocating divisible and indivisible goods -- Summary and conclusions
  • Editor: Princeton, N.J Princeton University Press
  • Data de criação/publicação: c2008
  • Formato: xvi, 373 p 24 cm.
  • Idioma: Inglês

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