skip to main content
Idioma:
Tipo de recurso Mostra resultados com: Mostra resultados com: Índice

The 'conjunction fallacy' revisited: how intelligent inferences look like reasoning errors

Hertwig, Ralph ; Gigerenzer, Gerd

Journal of behavioral decision making, 1999-12, Vol.12 (4), p.275-305 [Periódico revisado por pares]

Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

Texto completo disponível

Citações Citado por
  • Título:
    The 'conjunction fallacy' revisited: how intelligent inferences look like reasoning errors
  • Autor: Hertwig, Ralph ; Gigerenzer, Gerd
  • Assuntos: Cognition & reasoning ; conjunction fallacy ; Decision making ; Dictionaries ; frequentistic thinking ; Hypotheses ; Natural language ; Norms ; probabalistic thinking ; Probability ; Semantics ; Studies ; Tellers ; Womens rights movements
  • É parte de: Journal of behavioral decision making, 1999-12, Vol.12 (4), p.275-305
  • Notas: ArticleID:BDM323
    istex:4D7BBF3E85B6F158AA5690B9D9AEED3902FCD5F9
    ark:/67375/WNG-B5G9CMHS-V
  • Descrição: Findings in recent research on the ‘conjunction fallacy’ have been taken as evidence that our minds are not designed to work by the rules of probability. This conclusion springs from the idea that norms should be content‐blind—in the present case, the assumption that sound reasoning requires following the conjunction rule of probability theory. But content‐blind norms overlook some of the intelligent ways in which humans deal with uncertainty, for instance, when drawing semantic and pragmatic inferences. In a series of studies, we first show that people infer nonmathematical meanings of the polysemous term ‘probability’ in the classic Linda conjunction problem. We then demonstrate that one can design contexts in which people infer mathematical meanings of the term and are therefore more likely to conform to the conjunction rule. Finally, we report evidence that the term ‘frequency’ narrows the spectrum of possible interpretations of ‘probability’ down to its mathematical meanings, and that this fact—rather than the presence or absence of ‘extensional cues’—accounts for the low proportion of violations of the conjunction rule when people are asked for frequency judgments. We conclude that a failure to recognize the human capacity for semantic and pragmatic inference can lead rational responses to be misclassified as fallacies. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
  • Editor: Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
  • Idioma: Inglês
Voltar para lista de resultados

  • Realização: ABCD-USP USP   Logos de Redes Sociais: Freepik

Buscando em bases de dados remotas. Favor aguardar.