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Central Bank Independence and Deflation

Tokic, Damir

Public administration review, 2018-09, Vol.78 (5), p.803-808 [Periódico revisado por pares]

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Título:
Central Bank Independence and Deflation
Autor: Tokic, Damir
Assuntos: Banking ; Central banks ; Deflation ; Foreign policy ; Geopolitics ; Independence ; Inflation ; International trade ; Manipulation ; Monetary policy ; Money ; Prices ; Trade policy ; Viewpoint ; Wealth distribution
É parte de: Public administration review, 2018-09, Vol.78 (5), p.803-808
Descrição: Deflation presents special challenges to central banking, as traditional monetary policy tools are highly inefficient in dealing with deflationary pressures. In this case, the Federal Reserve must use alternative monetary policy tools that are specially designed to artificially boost asset prices through "printing press" or currency manipulation. Unfortunately, these alternative monetary policy tools create unintended political, geopolitical, and social consequences that overreach into the direct responsibilities of other branches of government. Thus, the government must be able to influence Federal Open Market Committee decisions that potentially affect (or contradict) U.S. foreign policy, U.S. trade policy, U.S. dollar policy, and deliberate domestic/global wealth distribution policies.
Editor: Hoboken, USA: Wiley Subscription Services, Inc
Idioma: Inglês

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