skip to main content
Visitante
Meu Espaço
Minha Conta
Sair
Identificação
This feature requires javascript
Tags
Revistas Eletrônicas (eJournals)
Livros Eletrônicos (eBooks)
Bases de Dados
Bibliotecas USP
Ajuda
Ajuda
Idioma:
Inglês
Espanhol
Português
This feature required javascript
This feature requires javascript
Primo Search
Busca Geral
Busca Geral
Acervo Físico
Acervo Físico
Produção Intelectual da USP
Produção USP
Search For:
Clear Search Box
Search in:
Busca Geral
Or hit Enter to replace search target
Or select another collection:
Search in:
Busca Geral
Busca Avançada
Busca por Índices
This feature requires javascript
This feature requires javascript
Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in the Cabinet
DEWAN, TORUN ; MYATT, DAVID P.
The American political science review, 2007-02, Vol.101 (1), p.63-77
[Periódico revisado por pares]
New York, USA: Cambridge University Press
Texto completo disponível
Citações
Citado por
Exibir Online
Detalhes
Resenhas & Tags
Mais Opções
Nº de Citações
This feature requires javascript
Enviar para
Adicionar ao Meu Espaço
Remover do Meu Espaço
E-mail (máximo 30 registros por vez)
Imprimir
Link permanente
Referência
EasyBib
EndNote
RefWorks
del.icio.us
Exportar RIS
Exportar BibTeX
This feature requires javascript
Título:
Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in the Cabinet
Autor:
DEWAN, TORUN
;
MYATT, DAVID P.
Assuntos:
Activism
;
Cabinet
;
Careers
;
Credibility
;
Economic models
;
Government cabinets
;
Incentives
;
Income effect
;
Liberal democracy
;
Peer Acceptance
;
Policy analysis
;
Policy Making
;
Political activism
;
Political behavior
;
Political campaigns
;
Political culture
;
Political influence
;
Political parties
;
Political science
;
Political sociology
;
Political systems
;
Politicians
;
Politics
;
Prime Ministers
;
Public opinion
;
Public policy
;
Resignations
;
Scandals
;
Strikes
;
Temptation
;
United Kingdom
É parte de:
The American political science review, 2007-02, Vol.101 (1), p.63-77
Notas:
ark:/67375/6GQ-K7S7030G-Z
istex:83A721536A2A534FFBD30C6E908B421649D234EF
PII:S0003055407070025
ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ObjectType-Article-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
Descrição:
Empirical evidence suggests that a prime minister benefits from firing ministers who are involved in political scandals. We explore a model in which scandals are positively related to policy activism, so that a prime minister may wish to protect a minister from resignation calls. We find that protection can sometimes discourage activism: it enhances the value of a minister's career and hence encourages him to “sit tight” by moderating his activities. On the other hand, an exogenous increase in exposure to scandals may lead a minister to “live for today” by pursuing controversial policies. The prime minister's ability to protect ministers is limited by her short-term incentive to fire. She may, however, enhance her credibility by building a collective reputation with the cabinet; the heterogeneity of cabinet membership plays an important role.
Editor:
New York, USA: Cambridge University Press
Idioma:
Inglês
This feature requires javascript
This feature requires javascript
Voltar para lista de resultados
This feature requires javascript
This feature requires javascript
Buscando em bases de dados remotas. Favor aguardar.
Buscando por
em
scope:(USP_VIDEOS),scope:("PRIMO"),scope:(USP_FISICO),scope:(USP_EREVISTAS),scope:(USP),scope:(USP_EBOOKS),scope:(USP_PRODUCAO),primo_central_multiple_fe
Mostrar o que foi encontrado até o momento
This feature requires javascript
This feature requires javascript