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The Act—Omission Doctrine and Negative Rights
Persson, Ingmar
The Journal of value inquiry, 2007-03, Vol.41 (1), p.15-29
[Periódico revisado por pares]
Dordrecht: Springer Nature B.V
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Título:
The Act—Omission Doctrine and Negative Rights
Autor:
Persson, Ingmar
Assuntos:
Death & dying
;
Historia
och
arkeologi
;
History and Archaeology
;
Human rights
;
Morality
;
Philosophy
;
Responsibilities
;
Studies
;
Values
É parte de:
The Journal of value inquiry, 2007-03, Vol.41 (1), p.15-29
Descrição:
The part of common sense morality that the act-omission doctrine has been thought to represent is more precisely to be understood in terms of two doctrines, the doctrine of negative rights and the doctrine that we are more responsible for what we cause, through no other responsible action, than for what we let happen. The reason why it is generally worse to kill non-threatening, non-consenting people than to let them die is that, generally, such killings violate a right, whereas such cases of letting die do not, since the general right to life is negative. It is, however, not always true, according to this theory of rights, that killing, or causing the death of, such people is morally worse than letting them die. But this fact is obscured by a tendency to misdescribe permissible killings and wrongful instances of letting die as instances of letting die and killing, respectively. Moreover, the reason why it is not permissible to violate a right to life in order to prevent the violation of a larger number of rights to life is the conception of responsibility which ties it to causation. Let us note, however, that this is meant only as an elucidation of a part of common sense morality, not as a justification of it, since no attempt has been made to justify rights or the causal sense of responsibility.
Editor:
Dordrecht: Springer Nature B.V
Idioma:
Inglês
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