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International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs

Simmons, Beth A.

The American political science review, 2000-12, Vol.94 (4), p.819-835 [Periódico revisado por pares]

New York, USA: Cambridge University Press

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Título:
International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs
Autor: Simmons, Beth A.
Assuntos: Acquiescence (Law) ; Agreements ; Case Studies ; Commitment ; Compliance ; Countries ; Credit ; Democracy ; Foreign exchange markets ; Foreign relations ; Government ; Gross domestic product ; International aspects ; International economic law ; International Economic Organizations ; International economic policy ; International economic relations ; International financial institutions ; International Law ; International monetary policy ; International politics ; International relations ; International relations theory ; Liberalism ; Monetary Policy ; Political science ; Reputation ; Reputations ; Restrictions ; Rule of law ; Sovereignty ; State ; Treaties ; Y2K
É parte de: The American political science review, 2000-12, Vol.94 (4), p.819-835
Notas: ObjectType-Article-2
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Descrição: Why do sovereign governments make international legal commitments, and what effect does international law have on state behavior? Very little empirical research tries to answer these questions in a systematic way. This article examines patterns of commitment to and compliance with international monetary law. I consider the signal governments try to send by committing themselves through international legal commitments, and I argue that reputational concerns explain patterns of compliance. One of the most important findings is that governments commit to and comply with legal obligations if other countries in their region do so. Competitive market forces, rather than overt policy pressure from the International Monetary Fund, are the most likely “enforcement” mechanism. Legal commitment has an extremely positive effect on governments that have recently removed restrictive policies, which indicates a desire to reestablish a reputation for compliance.
Editor: New York, USA: Cambridge University Press
Idioma: Inglês

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International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs

Simmons, Beth A.

New York, USA: Cambridge University Press

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