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In Defense of Fanaticism

Wilkinson, Hayden

Ethics, 2022-01, Vol.132 (2), p.445-477 [Periódico revisado por pares]

Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

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  • Título:
    In Defense of Fanaticism
  • Autor: Wilkinson, Hayden
  • Assuntos: Extremism ; Lotteries ; Probability
  • É parte de: Ethics, 2022-01, Vol.132 (2), p.445-477
  • Descrição: Which is better: a guarantee of a modest amount of moral value, or a tiny probability of arbitrarily large value? To prefer the latter seems fanatical. But, as I argue, avoiding such fanaticism brings severe problems. To do so, we must (1) decline intuitively attractive trade-offs; (2) rank structurally identical pairs of lotteries inconsistently, or else admit absurd sensitivity to tiny probability differences; (3) have rankings depend on remote, unaffected events (including events in ancient Egypt); and often (4) neglect to rank lotteries as we already know we would if we learned more. Compared to these implications, fanaticism is highly plausible.
  • Editor: Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
  • Idioma: Inglês

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