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Electoral incentives to coalition formation in multiparty presidential systems

Borges, André ; Turgeon, Mathieu ; Albala, Adrián

Party politics, 2021-11, Vol.27 (6), p.1279-1289 [Periódico revisado por pares]

London, England: SAGE Publications

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  • Título:
    Electoral incentives to coalition formation in multiparty presidential systems
  • Autor: Borges, André ; Turgeon, Mathieu ; Albala, Adrián
  • Assuntos: Agreements ; Bargaining ; Cabinet ; Coalition formation ; Cooperation ; Incentives ; International cooperation ; Legislatures ; Political majority ; Presidential systems ; Presidents ; Rewards
  • É parte de: Party politics, 2021-11, Vol.27 (6), p.1279-1289
  • Descrição: Coalition theories of presidential regimes have frequently assumed that coalition formation is a mostly post-electoral phenomenon. We challenge this view by showing that pre-electoral bargaining shapes to a substantial extent minority presidents’ disposition to cooperate with the legislature by forming a majority cabinet. Examining a dataset of pre- and post-electoral coalitions from 18 Latin American countries, we find that majority coalition cabinets are more likely to occur when elected presidents form pre-electoral coalitions (PECs), to the extent that pre-electoral agreements create stronger incentives for cooperation, by relying on a broader set of rewards than any post-electoral agreement. Moreover, we find that the likelihood of majority coalition formation increases as the share of PEC seats increases, thus reducing the need to engage in post-electoral bargaining. Our findings carry important implications for the study of cabinet formation in presidential regimes by introducing pre-electoral agreements as a key determinant of cabinet formation.
  • Editor: London, England: SAGE Publications
  • Idioma: Inglês
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