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The architecture of the Electoral College, the House size effect, and the referendum paradox

Barthélémy, Fabrice ; Martin, Mathieu ; Piggins, Ashley

Electoral studies, 2014-06, Vol.34, p.111-118 [Periódico revisado por pares]

Elsevier Ltd

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  • Título:
    The architecture of the Electoral College, the House size effect, and the referendum paradox
  • Autor: Barthélémy, Fabrice ; Martin, Mathieu ; Piggins, Ashley
  • Assuntos: Apportionment ; Architecture ; Elections ; Electoral College ; House size effect ; Humanities and Social Sciences ; Legislative Bodies ; Presidential Campaigns ; Presidents ; Referendum ; Referendum paradox ; Voting
  • É parte de: Electoral studies, 2014-06, Vol.34, p.111-118
  • Notas: ObjectType-Article-1
    SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
    ObjectType-Feature-2
    content type line 23
  • Descrição: Using data from U.S. presidential elections, we show how seemingly insignificant changes to what we call the “architecture” of the Electoral College can cause different candidates to be elected President, even when no one changes how they vote. We consider varying the size of the House of Representatives, the method of apportionment, the number of “Senate” electoral votes cast by each state, and the lower bound on the number of “House” electoral votes cast by each state. We consider, in particular, elections with a “referendum paradox”. In these elections, the electoral vote winner is not the popular vote winner. Our work extends Neubauer and Zeitlin (2003) who analyzed the case of the 2000 election. We give an explanation for the effects that we observe in the data. •We consider how varying the “architecture” of the Electoral College can change the outcome of presidential elections.•The most important of these variations involves changing the size of the House of Representatives.•We identify those elections that were subject to this “house size effect” and give an explanation for this effect.•A referendum paradox (where the electoral winner is not the popular vote winner) can arise even when there is no house size effect. We identify an election with this property.
  • Editor: Elsevier Ltd
  • Idioma: Inglês
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