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Why Levelling down Could Be Worse for Prioritarianism than for Egalitarianism
Persson, Ingmar
Ethical theory and moral practice, 2008-06, Vol.11 (3), p.295-303
[Periódico revisado por pares]
Dordrecht: Springer
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Título:
Why Levelling down Could Be Worse for Prioritarianism than for Egalitarianism
Autor:
Persson, Ingmar
Assuntos:
Deontology
;
Education
;
Egalitarianism
;
Equality
;
Ethics
;
Historia och arkeologi
;
History and Archaeology
;
Injustice
;
Justice
;
Legal objections
;
Ontology
;
Philosophical thought
;
Philosophy
;
Philosophy of Medicine
;
Political Philosophy
;
Prioritarianism
;
Teleology
;
Theory of Medicine/Bioethics
;
Utilitarianism
;
Well-being
;
Wellbeing
;
Zero
É parte de:
Ethical theory and moral practice, 2008-06, Vol.11 (3), p.295-303
Notas:
ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
Descrição:
Derek Parfit has argued that, in contrast to prioritarianism, egalitarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection, i.e., theobjection that it is absurd that a change which consists merely in the betteroff losing some of their well-being should be in one way for the better. In reply, this paper contends that (1) there is a plausible form of egalitarianism which is equivalent to another form of prioritarianism than the Parfitian one, a relational rather than an absolute form of prioritarianism, and that (2), although this relational or egalitarian form of prioritarianism is hit by the levelling down objection, the Parfitian form is also hit by it, or worse objections, if it is fully worked out.
Editor:
Dordrecht: Springer
Idioma:
Inglês
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