skip to main content
Idioma:

Emission tax and strategic environmental corporate social responsibility in a Cournot–Bertrand comparison

Xu, Lili ; Chen, Yuyan ; Lee, Sang-Ho

Energy economics, 2022-03, Vol.107, p.105846, Article 105846 [Periódico revisado por pares]

Kidlington: Elsevier B.V

Texto completo disponível

Citações Citado por
  • Título:
    Emission tax and strategic environmental corporate social responsibility in a Cournot–Bertrand comparison
  • Autor: Xu, Lili ; Chen, Yuyan ; Lee, Sang-Ho
  • Assuntos: Competition ; Cournot–Bertrand comparison ; Damage ; Economic analysis ; ECSR-then-tax ; Emission analysis ; Emission tax ; Emissions ; Energy economics ; Environmental corporate social responsibility ; Environmental tax ; Games ; Social responsibility ; Tax-then-ECSR ; Taxation
  • É parte de: Energy economics, 2022-03, Vol.107, p.105846, Article 105846
  • Descrição: This study considers the strategic relations between emission tax and environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) in a Cournot–Bertrand comparison and analyzes two different timings of the games between a tax-then-ECSR (T game) and an ECSR-then-tax (E game). We show that the T game always yields higher emission tax than the E game irrespective of competition modes, but lower ECSR under Cournot competition and higher ECSR when the marginal damage is high under Bertrand competition. We also show that compared with Bertrand competition, Cournot competition yields lower (higher) ECSR in the T (E) game but lower emission tax in the E game and higher emission tax when the product substitutability is low in the T game. We finally show that firms endogenously choose Cournot competition with the commitment of the E game irrespective of marginal damage and product substitutability. •We examine the strategic relations between emission tax and environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR).•We compare two different timings between a tax-then-ECSR (T game) and an ECSR-then-tax (E game).•The T game always yields higher emission tax than the E game irrespective of competition modes.•Cournot competition yields lower (higher) ECSR in the T (E) game than Bertrand competition.•Firms endogenously choose Cournot competition with the commitment of the E game.
  • Editor: Kidlington: Elsevier B.V
  • Idioma: Inglês
Voltar para lista de resultados
Ir para página anteriorAnterior Resultado  6 AvançarIr para próxima página

  • Realização: ABCD-USP USP   Logos de Redes Sociais: Freepik

Buscando em bases de dados remotas. Favor aguardar.