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A privacy preserving three-factor authentication protocol for e-Health clouds

Jiang, Qi ; Khan, Muhammad Khurram ; Lu, Xiang ; Ma, Jianfeng ; He, Debiao

The Journal of supercomputing, 2016-10, Vol.72 (10), p.3826-3849 [Periódico revisado por pares]

New York: Springer US

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  • Título:
    A privacy preserving three-factor authentication protocol for e-Health clouds
  • Autor: Jiang, Qi ; Khan, Muhammad Khurram ; Lu, Xiang ; Ma, Jianfeng ; He, Debiao
  • Assuntos: Compilers ; Computer Science ; Interpreters ; Privacy ; Processor Architectures ; Programming Languages
  • É parte de: The Journal of supercomputing, 2016-10, Vol.72 (10), p.3826-3849
  • Descrição: E-Health clouds are gaining increasing popularity by facilitating the storage and sharing of big data in healthcare. However, such an adoption also brings about a series of challenges, especially, how to ensure the security and privacy of highly sensitive health data. Among them, one of the major issues is authentication, which ensures that sensitive medical data in the cloud are not available to illegal users. Three-factor authentication combining password, smart card and biometrics perfectly matches this requirement by providing high security strength. Recently, Wu et al. proposed a three-factor authentication protocol based on elliptic curve cryptosystem which attempts to fulfill three-factor security and resist various existing attacks, providing many advantages over existing schemes. However, we first show that their scheme is susceptible to user impersonation attack in the registration phase. In addition, their scheme is also vulnerable to offline password guessing attack in the login and password change phase, under the condition that the mobile device is lost or stolen. Furthermore, it fails to provide user revocation when the mobile device is lost or stolen. To remedy these flaws, we put forward a robust three-factor authentication protocol, which not only guards various known attacks, but also provides more desired security properties. We demonstrate that our scheme provides mutual authentication using the Burrows–Abadi–Needham logic.
  • Editor: New York: Springer US
  • Idioma: Inglês

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