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Legislative Monopoly and the Size of Government

Anderson, Gary M. ; Tollison, Robert D.

Southern economic journal, 1988-01, Vol.54 (3), p.529-545 [Periódico revisado por pares]

Chapel Hill, N.C., etc: Southern Economic Association and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

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Título:
Legislative Monopoly and the Size of Government
Autor: Anderson, Gary M. ; Tollison, Robert D.
Assuntos: Antitrust legislation ; Competition ; Economic competition ; Economic legislation ; Economic models ; Government ; Government spending ; Input ; Legislatures ; Monopolies ; Monopoly ; Organized crime ; Output ; Policy making ; Political interest groups ; Political parties ; Public goods ; Statistical analysis ; Tax revenues ; Taxpaying ; Transfer ; Wealth
É parte de: Southern economic journal, 1988-01, Vol.54 (3), p.529-545
Notas: ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
Descrição: Buchanan's (1974) model of the behavior of organized crime is extended to the process of government, and the extension is tested empirically. It is hypothesized that governments characterized by higher entry barriers into political competition will tend to exhibit lower levels of total revenues. Regressions are run using data for the 48 contiguous states for the year 1984 and using federal data for the periods 1939-1974 and 1939-1982. The size of the legislative party majority is used as a proxy for the degree of monopolization in representation. The results support the hypothesis. All else equal, the size of the legislative majority appears to have a highly significant negative effect on the size of the overall tax burden imposed by a state government. Moreover, larger legislative majorities in the US Congress appear to have a significant effect in reducing the level of federal outlays. The results present some serious problems for the advocates of federalism.
Editor: Chapel Hill, N.C., etc: Southern Economic Association and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Idioma: Inglês

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Legislative Monopoly and the Size of Government

Anderson, Gary M. ; Tollison, Robert D.

Chapel Hill, N.C., etc: Southern Economic Association and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

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