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THE NON-DEMOCRATIC ROOTS OF ELITE CAPTURE: EVIDENCE FROM SOEHARTO MAYORS IN INDONESIA

Martinez-Bravo, Monica ; Mukherjee, Priya ; Stegmann, Andreas

Econometrica, 2017-11, Vol.85 (6), p.1991-2010 [Periódico revisado por pares]

Oxford, UK: Econometric Society

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  • Título:
    THE NON-DEMOCRATIC ROOTS OF ELITE CAPTURE: EVIDENCE FROM SOEHARTO MAYORS IN INDONESIA
  • Autor: Martinez-Bravo, Monica ; Mukherjee, Priya ; Stegmann, Andreas
  • Assuntos: de facto power ; Democracy ; democratic transitions ; Elite capture ; Elites ; Governance ; Indonesia ; Interest groups ; Mayors ; NOTES AND COMMENTS ; Politics ; public good provision
  • É parte de: Econometrica, 2017-11, Vol.85 (6), p.1991-2010
  • Descrição: Democracies widely differ in the extent to which powerful elites and interest groups retain influence over politics. While a large literature argues that elite capture is rooted in a country's history, our understanding of the determinants of elite persistence is limited. In this paper, we show that allowing old-regime agents to remain in office during democratic transitions is a key determinant of the extent of elite capture. We exploit quasi-random from Indonesia: Soeharto-regime mayors were allowed to finish their terms before being replaced by new leaders. Since mayors' political cycles were not synchronized, this event generated exogenous variation in how long old-regime mayors remained in their position during the democratic transition. Districts with longer exposure to old-regime mayors experience worse governance outcomes, higher elite persistence, and lower political competition in the medium run. The results suggest that slower transitions towards democracy allow the old-regime elites to capture democracy.
  • Editor: Oxford, UK: Econometric Society
  • Idioma: Inglês
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  • Realização: ABCD-USP USP   Logos de Redes Sociais: Freepik

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