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PREFERENCES FOR TRUTH-TELLING

Abeler, Johannes ; Nosenzo, Daniele ; Raymond, Collin

Econometrica, 2019-07, Vol.87 (4), p.1115-1153 [Periódico revisado por pares]

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Título:
PREFERENCES FOR TRUTH-TELLING
Autor: Abeler, Johannes ; Nosenzo, Daniele ; Raymond, Collin
Assuntos: Economic models ; Economists ; Experimental psychology ; honesty ; lying ; meta study ; Preferences ; Private information ; Truth ; truth‐telling
É parte de: Econometrica, 2019-07, Vol.87 (4), p.1115-1153
Descrição: Private information is at the heart of many economic activities. For decades, economists have assumed that individuals are willing to misreport private information if this maximizes their material payoff. We combine data from 90 experimental studies in economics, psychology, and sociology, and show that, in fact, people lie surprisingly little. We then formalize a wide range of potential explanations for the observed behavior, identify testable predictions that can distinguish between the models, and conduct new experiments to do so. Our empirical evidence suggests that a preference for being seen as honest and a preference for being honest are the main motivations for truth-telling.
Editor: Evanston: Econometric Society
Idioma: Inglês

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