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Metaethical Contextualism Defended

Björnsson, Gunnar ; Finlay, Stephen Finlay, Stephen ; Björnsson, Gunnar ; Stephen Finlay ; Gunnar Björnsson

Ethics, 2010-10, Vol.121 (1), p.7-36 [Periódico revisado por pares]

Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press

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Título:
Metaethical Contextualism Defended
Autor: Björnsson, Gunnar ; Finlay, Stephen
Finlay, Stephen ; Björnsson, Gunnar ; Stephen Finlay ; Gunnar Björnsson
Assuntos: assessor relativism ; context-insensitive assessments ; Contextualism ; disagreement ; Ethics ; Evaluation ; Filosofi ; Filosofiämnen ; Historisk-filosofiska ämnen ; History and philosophy subjects ; HUMANIORA och RELIGIONSVETENSKAP ; HUMANITIES and RELIGION ; Information ; information relativity ; Information relevance ; Information standards ; insensitive assessments ; John MacFarlande ; John MacFarlane ; Judgment ; Metaethical contextaulism ; Metaethical contextualism ; Mining ; mora disagreement ; Moral judgment ; Moral philosophy ; Morality ; Morals ; Niko Kolodny ; Normativity ; Philosophy ; Philosophy subjects ; Physics ; Practical philosophy ; Pragmatics ; Praktisk filosofi ; Relativity ; Semantics ; Theory of values and moral philosophy ; Theory of values and moral philosophy. Philosophy of action ; Truth ; Values
É parte de: Ethics, 2010-10, Vol.121 (1), p.7-36
Notas: ObjectType-Article-1
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Descrição: We defend a contextualist account of normative judgments as relativized both to (i) information and to (ii) standards or ends against recent objections that turn on practices of normative disagreement. Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane argue that information-relative contextualism cannot accommodate the connection between deliberation and advice. In response, we suggest that they misidentify the basic concerns of deliberating agents, which are not to settle the truth of particular propositions but to promote certain values. For pragmatic reasons, semantic assessments of normative claims sometimes are evaluations of propositions other than those asserted. Other writers have raised parallel objections to standard-relative contextualism, particularly about moral claims; we argue for a parallel solution.
Editor: Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press
Idioma: Inglês

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Metaethical Contextualism Defended

Björnsson, Gunnar ; Finlay, Stephen Finlay, Stephen ; Björnsson, Gunnar ; Stephen Finlay ; Gunnar Björnsson

Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press

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