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Replication Data for: The Politics of Rejection: Explaining Chinese Import Refusals
Kim, Sung
Eun
; Perlman, Rebecca
L
. ; Zeng, Grace
Harvard Dataverse 2024
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Título:
Replication Data for: The Politics of Rejection: Explaining Chinese Import Refusals
Autor:
Kim, Sung
Eun
;
Perlman, Rebecca
L
.
;
Zeng, Grace
Descrição:
Health and safety standards offer a convenient means by which governments can credibly claim to be protecting the population, even while pursuing less publicly-oriented goals. In the realm of international trade, such regulatory standards have most often been studied as a method of veiled protectionism that can help nations privilege domestic industry while skirting World Trade Organization requirements of openness. Yet precisely because health and safety standards create ambiguity about their intent and are therefore difficult to punish, nations may be incentivized to use them for goals that extend well beyond protecting domestic industry. In particular, we theorize that governments will, at times, enforce regulations in ways intended to exact political retribution. In order to show this, we collect and translate original data on import refusals by Chinese border inspectors between 2011 and 2019. Though ostensibly intended to keep dangerous products out of the hands of Chinese consumers, we demonstrate that import refusals have systematically been used by the Chinese government as a way to punish states that act against China's interest.
Editor:
Harvard Dataverse
Data de criação/publicação:
2024
Idioma:
Inglês
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