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Responsibility Attribution for Collective Decision Makers

Duch, Raymond ; Przepiorka, Wojtek ; Stevenson, Randolph

American journal of political science, 2015-04, Vol.59 (2), p.372-389 [Periódico revisado por pares]

Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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  • Título:
    Responsibility Attribution for Collective Decision Makers
  • Autor: Duch, Raymond ; Przepiorka, Wojtek ; Stevenson, Randolph
  • Assuntos: Attribution ; Decision making ; Dictators ; Experiment design ; Experiments ; Game theory ; Games ; Government cabinets ; Government coalitions ; Heuristics ; International Organizations ; Internet ; Laboratories ; Majority voting ; Political parties ; Political science ; Responsibility ; Return on investment ; Veto ; Voter behavior ; Voting ; Voting Behavior
  • É parte de: American journal of political science, 2015-04, Vol.59 (2), p.372-389
  • Notas: ArticleID:AJPS12140
    ark:/67375/WNG-TMBH3KFM-W
    istex:92EC3A071BED5B4CB74D66D469C6D76D925F5CE7
    .
    http://www.raymondduch.com/replications
    The experiments reported in this article were conducted at Nuffield College Centre for Experimental Social Sciences. This work was partly supported by generous funding from Nuffield College Centre for Experimental Social Sciences and the Swiss National Science Foundation (grant number 100017_124877). We thank Inaki Sagarzazu and Akitaka Matsuo for their excellent research assistance. We would like to thank Yuval Heller and Dominik Duell for their very helpful comments. Finally, we are very much indebted for the comments received from the participants of the Comparative Politics Seminar at Stanford University, Politics Seminar at the University of Essex, the LSE Politics Seminar, the Economics Seminar Series at the University of Cape Town, South Africa, the University of Oxford Economics Society, the Cambridge Society for Economic Pluralism, the Hertie School Seminar Series, and the Texas A&M Political Science Seminar. Replication data and files are available at
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  • Descrição: We argue that individuals use responsibility attribution heuristics that apply to collective decisions made, for example, by families, teams within firms, boards in international organizations, or coalition governments. We conduct laboratory and online experiments to tease out the heuristics subjects use in their responsibility attribution for collective decision makers. The lab experiments comprise a collective dictator game in which decision makers have weighted votes and recipients can punish individual decision makers. Our results show that recipients punish unfair allocations and mainly target the decision maker with proposal power and with the largest vote share. We find weak evidence that decision makers with veto power are targeted or that recipients punish proportional to vote share. The online experiment demonstrates that subjects indeed believe that the decision maker with proposal power has the most influence on the collective decision outcome. We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of vote choice.
  • Editor: Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
  • Idioma: Inglês
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