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Net neutrality and investment incentives

Pil Choi, Jay ; Kim, Byung-Cheol

The Rand journal of economics, 2010-09, Vol.41 (3), p.446-471 [Periódico revisado por pares]

Malden, USA: Blackwell Publishing Inc

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Título:
Net neutrality and investment incentives
Autor: Pil Choi, Jay ; Kim, Byung-Cheol
Assuntos: Advantages ; Consumer economics ; End users ; Fees ; Financial incentives ; Financial investments ; Incentives ; Information and communication technologies ; Internet ; Internet access ; Internet service providers ; Investment ; Investment analysis ; Laws, regulations and rules ; Net investment ; Net neutrality ; Pricing ; Regulation ; Social welfare ; Studies ; Telecommunications industry ; Telecommunications policy ; Transportation costs ; U.S.A ; Web content delivery
É parte de: The Rand journal of economics, 2010-09, Vol.41 (3), p.446-471
Notas: ark:/67375/WNG-NN1JRQHQ-F
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ArticleID:RAND107
We are grateful to the coeditor and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions, which greatly improved the article. We also thank Paul de Bijl, Nick Economides, and participants in various conferences and seminars for helpful comments, and Jane Choi for her editorial assistance. The first draft of this article was completed during Choi's research visit to the ISCR and the School of Economics and Finance at Victoria University of Wellington, whose hospitality is greatly appreciated. This article received the Public Utility Research Center Prize for the best paper in regulatory economics, which was awarded at the Seventh Annual International Industrial Organization Conference. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the NET Institute for this research. All errors, if any, are ours.
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Descrição: This article analyzes the effects of net neutrality regulation on investment incentives for Internet service providers (ISPs) and content providers (CPs), and their implications for social welfare. Concerning the ISPs' investment incentives, we find that capacity expansion decreases the sale price of the priority right under the discriminatory regime. Thus, contrary to ISPs' claims that net neutrality regulations would have a chilling effect on their incentive to invest, we cannot dismiss the possibility of the opposite. A discriminatory regime can also weaken CPs' investment incentives because of CPs' concern that the ISP would expropriate some of the investment benefits.
Editor: Malden, USA: Blackwell Publishing Inc
Idioma: Inglês

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Net neutrality and investment incentives

Pil Choi, Jay ; Kim, Byung-Cheol

Malden, USA: Blackwell Publishing Inc

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