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Mixed Strategies in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Romero, Julian ; Rosokha, Yaroslav

Econometrica, 2023-11, Vol.91 (6), p.2295-2331 [Periódico revisado por pares]

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Título:
Mixed Strategies in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
Autor: Romero, Julian ; Rosokha, Yaroslav
Assuntos: Economic theory ; experimental design ; finite mixture models ; Game theory ; Indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma ; mixed strategies ; Research subjects ; strategy elicitation
É parte de: Econometrica, 2023-11, Vol.91 (6), p.2295-2331
Descrição: Identifying the strategies that are played is critical to understanding behavior in repeated games. This process is difficult because only choices (not strategies) are observable. Recently, a debate has emerged regarding whether subjects play mixed strategies in the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. We use an experimental approach to elicit mixed strategies from human subjects, thereby providing direct empirical evidence. We find that a majority of subjects use mixed strategies. However, the data also suggest subjects' strategies are becoming less mixed over time, and move toward three focal pure strategies: Tit For Tat, Grim Trigger, and Always Defect. We use the elicited strategies to provide an empirically‐relevant foundation for analyzing commonly used mixture model estimation procedures.
Editor: Evanston: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Idioma: Inglês

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