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Misleading Motives: Incentives for Accounting Bias in Not-for-Profit Pension Plans

Gupta, Anubhav ; Matkin, David

Nonprofit and voluntary sector quarterly, 2024-08, Vol.53 (4), p.997-1027 [Periódico revisado por pares]

Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications

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  • Título:
    Misleading Motives: Incentives for Accounting Bias in Not-for-Profit Pension Plans
  • Autor: Gupta, Anubhav ; Matkin, David
  • Assuntos: Accounting ; Aggressiveness ; Assumptions ; Bias ; Companies ; Financial incentives ; Nonprofit organizations ; Private sector ; Profits ; Rates of return
  • É parte de: Nonprofit and voluntary sector quarterly, 2024-08, Vol.53 (4), p.997-1027
  • Descrição: In this study, we examine whether not-for-profit organizations actively manage their pension accounting assumptions and whether their assumptions are, as prior research suggests, more aggressive than those of for-profit organizations. Using a 17-year panel dataset collected from audited financial statements, we compare the accounting assumptions (the expected rate of return and the discount rate) of not-for-profit and for-profit firms. We also examine the not-for-profit sample alone to test for accounting bias motivated by various financial incentives. We model accounting assumptions as levels (between-firms) as well as changes over time (within-firms). Contrary to prior research, we find no evidence that not-for-profits use more aggressive assumptions than for-profits. Furthermore, we find that most of the accounting biases of not-for-profits are explained by between-firm variation rather than within-firm variation, suggesting that although not-for-profits use biased assumptions, they may not actively adjust them to target financial benchmarks.
  • Editor: Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications
  • Idioma: Inglês

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