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First-Best Equilibrium in Insurance Markets With Transaction Costs and Heterogeneity

Liu, Jerry W. ; Browne, Mark J.

The Journal of risk and insurance, 2007-12, Vol.74 (4), p.739-760 [Periódico revisado por pares]

Malden, USA: Blackwell Publishing Inc

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  • Título:
    First-Best Equilibrium in Insurance Markets With Transaction Costs and Heterogeneity
  • Autor: Liu, Jerry W. ; Browne, Mark J.
  • Assuntos: Accidents ; Analysis ; Budget line ; Consumer preferences ; Customers ; Financial risk ; Indifference curves ; Insurance ; Insurance markets ; Insurance premiums ; Market equilibrium ; Risk aversion ; Transaction costs
  • É parte de: The Journal of risk and insurance, 2007-12, Vol.74 (4), p.739-760
  • Notas: ark:/67375/WNG-1ZF9SMZS-F
    istex:094EE24B931AF56614A2B54364BB4570945DCA60
    ArticleID:JORI232
    We thank Thomas Cosimano, Suzanne Bellezza, Georges Dionne, Edward Frees, Thomas Gresik, Donald Hausch, Szilvia Papai, Pierre Picard, Robert Puelz, Cheng‐zhong Qin, Larry Samuelson, Virginia Young, and seminar participants at the 2003 Risk Theory Society meeting, University of Wisconsin–Madison for helpful comments. The suggestions of two anonymous referees were especially helpful in improving the article. All errors are strictly ours.
    mbrowne@bus.wisc.edu
    and
    The authors can be contacted via e‐mail
    jerry.w.liu@gmail.com
    ObjectType-Article-1
    SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
    ObjectType-Feature-2
    content type line 23
  • Descrição: We investigate extensions of the classic Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) (RS) model of adverse selection under asymmetric information. In RS, low-risk customers are worse off owing to an externality created by high-risk buyers in the market. We find critical changes in insurance buyers' behavior under the joint assumptions of transaction costs and buyer heterogeneity with respect to either risk aversion or wealth. Combining transaction costs and heterogeneity, we find a separating equilibrium in which neither high-risk nor low-risk individuals are penalized due to information asymmetry.
  • Editor: Malden, USA: Blackwell Publishing Inc
  • Idioma: Inglês
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  • Realização: ABCD-USP USP   Logos de Redes Sociais: Freepik

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