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Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls versus Taxes
Buchanan, James M. ; Tullock, Gordon
The American economic review, 1975-03, Vol.65 (1), p.139-147
[Periódico revisado por pares]
Menasha, Wis: The American Economic Association
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Título:
Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls versus Taxes
Autor:
Buchanan, James M.
;
Tullock, Gordon
Assuntos:
Costs
;
Economic externalities
;
Economic regulation
;
Economic theory
;
Environmental policy
;
Income taxes
;
Industrial efficiency
;
Industrial output
;
Industrial production
;
Industrial regulation
;
Pollution
;
Pollution control costs
;
Pollution control in industry
;
Public policy
;
Regulation
;
Tax aspects
;
Tax benefits
;
Taxation
;
Taxes
É parte de:
The American economic review, 1975-03, Vol.65 (1), p.139-147
Notas:
ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 23
Descrição:
A POSITIVE THEORY OF EXTERNALITY CONTROL IS PRESENTED THAT EXPLAINS THE OBSERVED FREQUENCY OF DIRECT REGULATION AS OPPOSED TO PENALTY TAXES OR CHARGES. AN ELEMENTARY EFFICIENCY BASIS FOR PREFERRING TAXES AND CHARGES WHICH HERETOFORE HAS BEEN NEGLECTED BY ECONOMISTS, IS EMPHASIZED. IN THE PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY OF POLICY, THE INTERESTS OF THOSE WHO ARE SUBJECTED TO THE CONTROL INSTRUMENTS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AS WELL AS THE INTERESTS OF THOSE AFFECTED BY THE EXTERNAL DISECONOMIES. DECISIONS ON THE ALTERNATIVE POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS ARE SURELY INFLUENCED BY THE PREFERENCES OF THOSE WHO ARE SUBJECTED TO THEM. THE PUBLIC CHOICE APPROACH, WHICH CONCENTRATES ATTENTION ON THE INDIVIDUAL'S CHOICE AS BETWEEN POLICY INSTRUMENTS, ALLOWS HYPOTHESES TO BE CONSTRUCTED THAT EXPLAIN THE PREVALENCE OF DIRECT REGULATION. GRAPHS.
Editor:
Menasha, Wis: The American Economic Association
Idioma:
Inglês
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