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A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
Green, Jerry R. ; Stokey, Nancy L.
The Journal of political economy, 1983-06, Vol.91 (3), p.349-364
[Periódico revisado por pares]
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
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Título:
A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
Autor:
Green, Jerry R.
;
Stokey, Nancy L.
Assuntos:
Absolute
;
Agents
;
Business orders
;
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
;
Contracts
;
CONTRACTS, CONTRACT ADMINISTRATORS
;
Distribution functions
;
Economic models
;
ECONOMIC THEORY
;
Economic value
;
Expected utility
;
MODELING, MODELS
;
OBSERVATION
;
Political economy
;
Random variables
;
Randomness
;
Risk aversion
;
SANCTION OF LAW AND SEMI-LEGAL PRIVATE ASSOCIATIONS AND SOCIAL GROUPS, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
;
Step functions
;
Tournaments & championships
;
Utility
;
Utility functions
É parte de:
The Journal of political economy, 1983-06, Vol.91 (3), p.349-364
Notas:
ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 23
Descrição:
Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agent's output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is common to all the agents. The principal observes only the output levels of the agents. It is shown that, in the absence of a common shock, using optimal independent contracts dominates using the optimal tournament. Conversely, if the distribution of the common shock is sufficiently diffuse, using the optimal tournament dominates using optimal independent contracts. Finally, it is shown that for a sufficiently large number of agents, a principal who cannot observe the common shock but uses the optimal tournament does as well as one who can observe the shock and uses independent contracts.
Editor:
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
Idioma:
Inglês
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