Idioma:

Bargaining unexplained

Usher, Dan

Public choice, 2012-04, Vol.151 (1/2), p.23-41 [Periódico revisado por pares]

Texto completo disponível

Citações Citado por

Título:
Bargaining unexplained
Autor: Usher, Dan
Assuntos: Agreements ; Bargaining ; Bargaining theory ; Collective bargaining ; Competition ; Economic models ; Economic theory ; Economics ; Economics and Finance ; Equilibrium ; Equilibrium theory ; Fairness ; International ; Joint ventures ; Litigation ; Nash equilibrium ; Negotiation ; Political Science ; Property rights ; Public Choice ; Public Finance ; Self interest ; Transaction costs ; War
É parte de: Public choice, 2012-04, Vol.151 (1/2), p.23-41
Notas: ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 23
ObjectType-Article-2
ObjectType-Feature-1
Descrição: Is there a bargaining equilibrium comparable to the equilibrium in the competitive economy? The claim in this paper is that there is not. Bargaining models with well-specified equilibria have been built upon a shared sense of what is fair, concessions in proportion to harm from failure to agree or an imposed bargaining procedure. The claim is that these models either come dangerously close to assuming what they seek to prove or define bargaining as something other than what it is commonly understood to be. We know that people strike bargains and that civilized life could not proceed otherwise, but something over and above pure self-interest is required for bargaining and compromise to take place.
Editor: Boston: Springer
Idioma: Inglês

Voltar para lista de resultados